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EDWARD S. ROBINSONt
M ODERN man has learned that in his mastery of his physical sur-
roundings and of his own body his success has been in direct
proportion to his factual knowledge. In these two realms he has ceased
to be dominated by magic and by emotional analogy. He no longer
assumes that the inventor must be a communicant of the devil and
that the damp night air rots the lungs. But there is a third great area-
the social environment-in which the old ways of thinking still dominate
public action. We do not say that a motor car's performance is satis-
factory because it is full of the spirit of efficiency. We are no longer
content to classify the undernourished child as just naturally puny. But
large numbers of us are willing to say that recent economic conditions
were due to a depression, that Dillinger became troublesome to society
because of his hard character, that the old-time barroom drunkard can
be eliminated if tables are substituted for bars and if saloons are called
taverns.
While the scientific method has been employed to transform the face
of the earth and the physical conditions of life, and while that same
method has been employed to develop hardier bodies and to suppress at
their sources many of the infectious diseases, only slight application of
this mode of thought has been made to the problems of social control.
The sociologists have coined the term, cultural lag,1 for this peculiar
state of modern society in which we utilize the scientific and fact-minded
attitude in dealing with physical and biological problems and, at the same
time, insist upon remaining free from the restraint of fact in our enter-
prises of social control.
There is a natural science of psychology which is busy applying the
scientific method to that crucial area called Mind, where the physical,
the biological, and the social worlds meet and exhibit their interde-
pendence. There is a natural science of sociology which is concerned
exclusively with the facts of social life. Occasionally a psychologist or
a sociologist has timidly suggested that his ideas might be useful in con-
nection with the larger problems of social regulation. Occasionally a
practical man-a lawyer, judge, or politician-has similarly suggested
the advantage of a fact-dominated attitude toward social problems, but
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the influence of such voices has been small. Mr. Aldous Huxley said
recently that international maladies are at bottom questions of psy-
chology and that the diplomats who have been called to the sick bed
simply do not possess an intellectual viewpoint adequate to their task.'
Yet there is certainly little immediate prospect that psychologists will
be consulted in regard to problems of such magnitude and importance.
The more urgently necessary is a social adjustment, the less likely are
our leading citizens to tolerate a frankly psychological and sociological
approach to it.
Where psychological and sociological data have been brought to bear
upon the making or enforcement of the law, they have rarely been per-
mitted to operate except in weak solution. When legislators seek to
adjust a delicate mechanism like the sale of securities or the institution
of marriage, they may call for the testimony of objective and disin-
terested men, but their resulting statutes are invariably encumbered with
words of merely emotional relevance.8 Such a practice would not repre-
sent a cultural lag if it were knowingly employed, but the experts are
continually mistaking the vividness of their moral indignation for the
probable efficiency of their devices for social control.
Lawyers Are Social Engineers
In our control of physical nature we are served by a special class of
men called engineers, who are rigorously trained, not only in the practical
tricks that can be used in the harnessing of physical forces, but also in
the mathematical and experimental sciences necessary for straight think-
ing about the physical world. Within their own sphere of activity the
engineers constitute, in the finest sense, an 6lite. It is generally accepted
that the outstanding peculiarities of present-day western civilization are
principally contributions of the engineer. The one set of ideas in which
the western world has any real confidence is that composing the physical
sciences-and the physical sciences are the engineer's philosophy.
Our present mode of life is undergoing severe criticism which at times
might seem to reflect upon our engineering leadership. It is said by
some that we have been paying too much attention to the control of the
physical world, that we have been too distracted by the materialistic
philosophy. The suggestion has been made (and not exactly in jest)
that the engineers and other natural scientists ought to take a holiday in
2. Huxley, Do We Require Orgies (1934) 23 YALE REVIw 466.
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order to permit social adjustments to the changes they have wrought.
But such criticism simply emphasizes the effectiveness of engineering
leadership. As a matter of fact, the notion that each increment in our
control of the physical world sets us back psychologically and socially
is largely illusory. Engineering leadership has given us unprecedented
productive facilities. No one can escape the fact that poverty is, at
least in America, an unnecessary social condition. But we have poverty
-widespread poverty-despite our physical equipment. There is a dis-
position under these circumstances to say that our present social troubles
are due to the fact that the engineers have led us onward too rapidly
and that somehow our very material progress has been our undoing.
Men indulge in nostalgic reminiscences of the old times when self-sufficient
farms operated by the power of muscles were the centers of life.
Though poverty may have existed then, it somehow was not a source of
such widespread public anxiety. But at least since the early physical
transformations of the Nineteenth Century men have been made increas-
ingly uncomfortable by undernourished children, by insecure parents, by
unattended sickness. In other words, the conquests of our engineering
leaders have made more and more apparent the fact that we have little
practical skill in adjusting our social arrangements to new circumstances
and that we lack any widely accepted social philosophy in terms of which
we can face the possibility of social change. The engineer has greatly
reduced the total amount of povery, but, by this achievement, he has
made all poverty appear, not as an act of God or Nature, but as an
expression of human clumsiness and inertia.
This lag in the philosophy and practice of social adjustment is not
due to the absence from our society of a profession of social engineers.'
Lawyers very clearly constitute such a profession. They are specialists
in social arrangements. And in certain superficial respects they may
seem to occupy a position analogous to that of the physician and the
engineer. Their services are indispensible when one wishes to get into
business or out of wedlock or to alter in any of a hundred ways one's
relationship to his fellows. In a way the lawyers are an 61ite. Most of
our political leaders are taken from this profession and the technical
language of political life is the technical language of law. Yet the public
attitude toward the lawyer is very different from that toward the
engineer.
It is recognized that the lawyer is a learned man, but there is some
doubt as to whether his learning is to be relied upon. It is recognized
that the lawyer has a skill and a set of technical concepts that give him a
unique social position, but there is little confidence that his outlook and
4. "Let us think of the problem of the end of law in terms of a great task or great
series of tasks of social engineering." PoumN, Tm Srmn' or Tm Coi .rou Lw (1921) 195.
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philosophy entitle him to be trusted to keep social arrangements abreast
of biological and physical possibilities. The engineer who invents the
internal combustion engine finds that buggy springs and steel tires are
interfering with the development of automotive transportation. He
therefore sets about to develop shock absorbers and soft tires. There
is little confidence, on the other hand, that lawyers as a group will set
to work to alter present laws of ownership and control as soon as they
become obstacles to a sensible distribution of goods. It is too often seen
that the lawyers are content to justify social changes after they have
happened and to deck out innovation in old-fashioned, reassuring words.
The engineer is seen to be a fearless adventurer. On the simple
assumption that it is man's destiny constantly to increase his control
over nature, he proceeds directly and courageously in the furtherance of
that aim. At times his leadership is actually ruthless. He invents a
machine which he knows will steal the jobs of thousands of men. He
raises the speed of the motor car though he knows that the greater speed
will lead an increasing number of men to kill themselves and each other.
In short the engineer is a leader whose very carelessness of customary
habits and values only emphasizes his social function. He assumes in
respect to physical nature that it is never better to let well enough alone.
In contrast, the lawyer is typically frightened by social innovation.
When he deals with an eight cylinder social machine, such as an inter-
locking corporation or a trial marriage, he typically considers it his pri-
mary duty to paint the engine to look like a horse. In doing so he
performs a social function. He permits those who are afraid of engines
to continue to believe that they are being drawn by the old gray mare.
But he frequently delays the achievement of a frank and thoroughgoing
adaptation to the machine.
There is nothing very new about these observations. Since the Eigh-
teenth Century the western world has gradually been assimilating the idea
of a progressive conquest over physical and biological nature. Within
our own times, early conservatism has given way increasingly to a spirit
that welcomes change. Although the first steam trains and the early
automobiles were almost more than the placid country-side could stand,
the airplane was more easily accepted. Men laughed heartily at the
germ theory of disease, but they have accepted the less credible story
of the vitamins without a murmur except that of interest. This con-
stant growth in man's control over nature has been called Progress and
progress has become the central motif of our cultureY In such an
atmosphere it would have been impossible not to recognize that legal
science has imposed a constant drag upon the adventurous spirit of the
times.
5. Becker, Progress, 12 ENCYC. Soc. Scr. 495.
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Whatever other elements it may contain, the New Deal has sought to
popularize the idea that the experimental, fact-dominated, forward-
looking view of natural science is relevant to the process of social adjust-
ment. And there is nothing very surprising in the Literary Digest's
finding that in the spring of 1934 the New Deal was favored by as few
lawyers as clergymen. Educators approved of the Roosevelt policies by
about 2 to 1, while clergymen approved by 12 to 10 and lawyers by
17 to 15. 6
The Answer of the Technocrats
One of the most naive and popular explanations of the lag in social
engineering is to be found in the suggestion that social adjustments
have been entrusted to the wrong men. The greatest success of the
modern world has been its increasing control over physical nature, but
we have not given the real engineers who have been responsible for this
progress an opportunity to reconstruct our social institutions. There
is a certain plausibility to this suggestion, as was demonstrated by the
marked, though brief, welcome accorded the technocrats. They assumed
that men who have proved themselves able to deal factually with one set
of life's conditions ought to be given wider opportunities. They felt
that social problems simply need restating in terms of energy
transformations.
The technocrats did not seem to realize that it is as unscientific to
force human nature into the model of a simple machine as it is to per-
sonify an automobile. They were, of course, correct in pointing out that
social thinking is frequently blind to plain physical facts and their efforts
to emphasize the importance of such facts was wholesome. But as
Stuart Chase puts it: Energy economics cannot be taken straight; it
needs a "chaser of psychology and anthropology.""
The engineer, and the same holds true of the physician, tends to take
a scientific attitude only to a limited range of problems. Give him a
circuit to design or an engine to test and he will surrender himself com-
pletely to the dictation of the facts. But give him a human personality
or a set of human relations and he will be as subject as another to the
sway of merely plausible and congenial opinions. We must not forget,
however, that the lawyer, too, sets aside many of his unscientific habits
when he is faced with problems which obviously fall within the realm of
natural science. He himself may lack the expert's skill to handle such
problems, but he has some grasp upon the philosophy of natural science.
6. (June 30, 1934) Tim LrrERY DiGESr 30.
7. A few of the many references on Technocracy are Scotr n onums, L0uronucio.;
To TEcn'ocRAcY (1933); BL.As m., TEcECm"oc .D SoCaus (1933); and Cmsrs,
TvCHOcRACY: Ax INTERPRETA'IoN (1933).
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Although he is willing to test a legal innovation in terms of the emotional
adjectives that can aptly be attached to it-by whether it seems more
natural to speak of it as bureaucracy or as an intelligent control-he
is less likely to tolerate a similar assessment of the power of a steam
engine or the voltage of an electric current.
It thus appears that the world is not divided into scientific people and
unscientific people, but rather into groups of problems for which our
general culture provides us with a scientific or an unscientific approach.
Recent psychological studies indicate that even young children interpret
simple physical phenomena in a relatively matter-of-fact manner. Super-
naturalism is present in the children's thinking mainly in connection with
subjects like the sun and stars that are frequently involved in the fairy
stories told them by adults."
We may look to the engineer, then, to observe the effectiveness of the
scientific viewpoint in that area where our general culture has accepted
that attitude, but we cannot look to the engineer to maintain his pro-
fessional attitude when he is confronted with problems that fall outside
that area. Although he may have been subjected to a rigid training in
scientific ways of thinking, the cultural pressure to use other modes of
thought in connection with psychological and social problems is continu-
ous throughout his career. He may have an uneasy feeling now and
then about the thinking of lawyers and politicians, but they continue to
supply him with most of his ideas about human nature. The engineer,
when called upon to frame a code of conduct in an industry or to settle
a dispute, will, like other men, seize upon the intellectual technique (that
is, the legalistic technique) which is most readily available and most
generally acceptable in our culture. The principal difference between
him and the lawyer is that, as a rule, because of lack of training in meet-
ing problems of this specific type, he is humanistically a good deal more
naiveY He is inclined to put to literal use outworn formulas which the
experienced lawyer uses only with his tongue in his cheek."0
The Lawman's Answer
Few lawyers would accept the not infrequent charge of laymen that
legal ways of thinking are fundamentally deceptive and that the legalistic
8. Huang, Children's Explanations of Strange Phenomena, 14 PsycnoLo0scHe Foistij-
uNG BD. 14; SMIH COLLEGE STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY (1930) No. 1.
9. It is sometimes said that science represents a method of inquiry independent of
the type of phenomena studied. E.g., 1 PxtmsoN, G mwnx or Sceice (3rd ed. London,
1911) 12. But the fact remains that some phenomena, because of our cultural attttudeq,
seem to invite scientific approach while others resist it.
10. Such is usually true of lay arbitrators. See Phillips, A Lawyer's Approach to Com-
mercial Arbitration (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 31.
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administration of social life rarely serves anything but narrow, profes-
sional interest." The men of law would generally agree, however, that
as compared with natural science, jurisprudence is vague and uncertain,
and that, as compared with the practical activities of the engineer, those
of the lawyer are bungling and indecisive. Occasionally we do find a
jurist who resents the unfavorable comparison of jurisprudence to
natural science and who is inclined to charge the critics of the law either
with simple ignorance of legal learning or else with some sinister purpose
to undermine respect for law. Such jurists believe that the meaning of
the Constitution stands like the Rock of Ages. Unscrupulous men may
ignore its strict apportionment of rights and duties; ignorant men may
never reach an understanding of its beneficent provisions. There it
stands, a proper object for study and veneration, but never an instrument
to be used according to the needs of the times. Such jurists also believe
that the great mass of judicial decisions making up the common or cus-
tomary law also contains an intrinsic rationality and truth. Paradoxes
and conflicts within this law can all be explained away by industrious
study. In our further discussions of the juristic mentality we shall
have a good deal to say about this ideal legal science that men struggle
to understand. It is a view reminding one of the theological theory that
the scriptures contain a perfect body of truth which seems to vary only
because our understanding varies. Men who hold such a theory are
likely to glory in the very bigness of the law books, their comet-tails of
footnotes, and the fact that it is very easy for a competent legal scholar
to make any legal problem very hard.
But we need not pause too long over the attitude of these absolut-
ists. We would do better at this point to note the comments of those
whose general point of view is more consonant with the times.
The point is often made that though the lawyers may be encumbered
with many antiquated conceptions and terms, the development of a
genuine science of law has for a long time been under way. Professor
Arthur L. Goodhart of Oxford is a brilliant, but essentially contented,
student of the law. He is quite willing to reject such a statement as the
following from Blackstone: "The judgment, though pronounced or
awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the
determination and sentence of the law. It is the conclusion that natur-
ally and regularly follows from the premises of law and fact." But he
feels that recent American writers have made too much of the artificiality
of such a separation between the judge and his decisions. He tells us
that Archdeacon Paley, as early as 1782, saw that the law could be
11. For a vivid picture of how the law appears to one physician, see Hamilton, WI:at
About the Lawyers? (Oct., 1931) 163 HARPEus 542.
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approached as a set of facts rather than as a body of self-sufficient logical
concepts and relations. And fifty years later, in 1832, the great John
Austin also criticized Blackstone's "transcendental" attitude toward
law.12 We might add that Jeremy Bentham wished to found a science of
legislation upon psychological actualities. He contended that the law
should increase the total of concrete human happiness and that it should
cease to serve purely abstract and theoretical rights. 3  Then there was
Lord Westbury who pointed out in unambiguous terms the lack of genu-
ine observation and inductive generalization regarding the actual work-
ings of the law.'4 Or we might move somewhat nearer to our own day
and show how, in 1897, Judge Holmes of Massachusetts was recom-
mending that students recognize the close articulation between jurispru-
dence and such a social study as political economy., The implication
seems to be, that since legal scholars have known, for so long, the possi-
bility of facing law as a human institution-as a type of human behavior
rather than as a system of mediaeval theology-why should anyone
continue to make a fuss about the business? If great men of the law
have occasionally doffed their hats to scientific method, is not legtl
learning coming up to all reasonable expectation?
Another answer of the lawmen is that they are not as backward as
they seem. Despite the fact that the law in the books is admittedly
antiquated, courts and lawyers have discovered multifarious ways of
avoiding the literal dictates of the bookish lore. In many jurisdictions
it is held that divorce is possible only when one party to a marriage has
offended the other and even in that case it is held that only one of the
parties can aid in securing the divorce. If both parties have offended,
there can be no divorce. If both parties wish rescission of the marriage,
rescission becomes impossible. Such rules of course describe a situa-
tion which was once reasonably faithful to social facts. Before her
economic independence woman was unlikely to bring divorce proceedings
unless she was sorely aggrieved. In a day of more fixed and elaborate
family life, in a day when a community would look with scorn upon a
man who could not retain the allegiance of his wife, there were stronger
forces tending to make a partner resist divorce and to attempt to prove
12. Goodhart, Some American Interpretations of Law, Modern Theories of Law (Mil-
ford ed. 1933). PALEY, MORAL AND PoIrIcAL PninosoPuy (1790) 2, 32, where he gives
an account of "The Causes of the Numerous Uncertainties and Difficulties Arising In the
Administration of Justice." 2 AusTIN, LEcTnES ON JURISPRUDENCE (Sth ed. 1911).
13. BENHAm, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1879).
14. Quoted by Roscoe Pound Anachronisms in Law (1921) 3 J. Am. JUDICATURE Soc.
142, from 1 NASH, LIFE oF LORD WESmURY (1888) 191.




his innocence. But economic conditions and moral standards have
changed. Though it is hardly typical for modern men and women to
seek divorce lightly, the proceeding is rapidly losing its old meanings.
When men and women are thoroughly uncongenial they are both more
interested in divorce than in proving who is in the wrong. Divorce is
increasingly sought as a result of mutual agreement and with no real
intention of fixing the blame.'6 Upon the basis of the report of the
Bureau of the Census for 1929, Marshall and May conclude that only
11.8 per cent of the actions for divorce were actually contested. Thus
the picture of divorce as the outcome of a contest, which one would be
impelled to assume from a reading of the law books, turns out to be a
"mirage." 7
But how are contests avoided when doctrine so plainly makes them
essential to the process of divorce? One party might be so convinced
of his own guilt that he would prefer to forfeit the case rather than to
testify in court. If the party against whom the suit is brought should
fail to appear, this might be interpreted as a sign of collusion-as a sign
that he is voluntarily putting himself in a bad light to facilitate the
divorce. But the court is the only party having an interest in this point
and by taking the interest lightly it can prevent legal doctrine from inter-
fering with changing marriage customs. Awkwardness upon the side of
counsel or litigants or stubbornness upon the side of the court may
occasionally block a mutually desired divorce, but in the main the legal
institution is able to keep its action abreast of the times without unduly
offending the ancient ideals represented by its doctrines.
This discrepancy between the law in action and the law in books is
illustrated again and again throughout the legal institution. We find
criminal courts, for example, which dispose of large proportions of their
cases after the manner of a psychiatric clinic and which put on rituals
in celebration of retribution and revenge only when public attention
makes them self-conscious.
The conclusion drawn from this situation by many "practical" lawyers
is that the cultural lag represented by the law is due to its doctrines.
The fact that the courts are constantly having to get around the theories
shows that the theories are encumbrances which ought to be discarded.
A good starting point would be with the law schools, which tend to keep
alive outworn conceptions simply because they provide such plentiful
16. For a thorough account of marriage and divorce by a lawyer who is also a plhozo-
pher see Ulewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1281, and (1933)
33 CoL. L. REv. 248. See also ERBERT, HoLY DEatDLocK (1934) (a satire on the law of
divorce in England).
17. 1 MUknsxm Aim MAY, Ta DIvoRcE CounT, MAnYLANW, (1932).
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pedagogical fodder. Law students and teachers, it is said, ought to focus
their attention upon the law in action, because at this level the law is
most frequently in harmony with social reality. Such a viewpoint is
naturally congenial to Americans who have always had more respect for
the direct action of the practical man than for the perspective of the
philosopher.18
This ideal of a theoryless law obviously overlooks the fact that men
have never been able to escape the influence of theory upon their serious
transactions. Men sometimes insist upon keeping their doctrines to
themselves, but the doctrines refuse to be kept down. Like the repressed
impulses of which the psychiatrist talks, philosophies have all sorts of
indirect ways of showing themselves?
The lawyer, or student, who avoids theoretical discussion as impracti-
cal is the very person whose judgment is most enslaved by doctrines that
need remodelling. "We have too little theory in the law, rather than
too much. . * 2 This remark, made nearly forty years ago by Judge
Holmes of Massachusetts, is even more applicable today. The astound-
ing effectiveness of engineering has come because of a respect on the
part of practical men for the achievements of the theoretical physicists
and chemists. Who suggests that engineering thought should confine
itself to the ideas that are to be discovered in the inarticulate fumblings
of mechanics in their workshops!
2'
Wanted: A Philosophy
When one compares social engineering as practiced by the lawyer with
the biological engineering of the physician and with the physical engineer-
ing of the engineer himself, one does not, as a matter of fact, discover any
lack of immediate and practical sagacity upon the lawyer's part. So
long as we keep our minds off the larger purposes of social life we
18. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School? (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. Ray.
907 ha, stressed the use that should be made of the "law in action" in the education of the
law student. But he is not so naive as to suppose that practical contact with the courts
will give the law student an adequate juristic philosophy. That end he would obtain by
admitting into the law schools such history, anthropology, and psycholdgy as Is necessary
for our understanding of law as human behavior.
19. Yntema, Legal Science and Reform (1934) 34 CoL. L. REV. 207 has criticised in
some detail the idea that common sense is an adequate basis for legal reform.
20. Holmes, The Path of the Law, reprinted in COLLECTED LEcAi, PAPERS (1921) 167,
198. On the present need of legal philosophy, see POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO TH.
PmrrosoPHY or LAw (1925.) c. 1.
21. That modern physical science upon which engineering is based represents an intel-
lectual revolution rather than a mere refinement of the physical techniques of plain men is
shown clearly in WmTEHEAD, SCIENCE Am TE MODERN WoRLD (1925); Buarr, THE MErA-
PHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE (1932); NoRTnoP, SCIENCE AND
FIRST PRcIPLEs (1931) and in many other recent studies of the philosophy of science.
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are not conscious that law is a cultural laggard. Granted the aims of
the undertakings, there is little to complain about in the capacity of
legal skill to weave a gauze of gentle words about the character of a
defendant, to tangle a corporation so that inquisitors shall not know
where to lay hold of it, or from the bench and in another mood, to deal
out fines and phrases to the immediate satisfaction of the community.
The most important distinction between the man of law and the man
of natural science is that the jurist is philosophically lost. Living in
the constant presence of scientific achievement, he feels and is influenced
by the pull of fact. At the same time he has a curious sense of loyalty
to political and moral ideas that are supposed to be independent of the
world as science knows it.
22
When physicians first realized that they could assuage the pain of child-
birth by the administration of an anaesthetic, they were confused. They
still felt that their scientific ideas should not be allowed to contradict
their moral ideas and they had told themselves for a long time that the
agonies of childbirth had a moral sanction. In medicine, the old philoso-
phy went down before the obvious dictation of the natural facts, because
medicine was rapidly reforming its philosophy and setting aside ideas of
sin and retribution.' But in the law, conflicts of this type are more
persistent and more numerous and the facts are much easier to ignore.
At one moment we find the man of law apparently living by the phi-
losophy of natural science. Where parental authority insists upon faith-
healing for a suffering child, the jurist may find no difficulty in abrogating
ancient parental prerogatives and in turning the child over to the doctors.
In the next moment, however, we are apt to find his practical behavior
directed by tribal customs and superstitions that are clearly in conflict
with scientific ways of thinking.
When a life must go out, the man of science has the clear aim to make
the transition easy. The man of law, however, feels impelled to con-
duct an execution in a painful, ceremonial atmosphere with a victim who
is sane and sober. He is unwilling or unable to escape the ancient myth
that the murderer is making payment of a debt. He may, as a man, be
22. One of the best illustrations of the confusion resulting from an attempt to deal
in purely juristic terms with an essentially scientific problem is to be found in the casjss
involving the basic radio patents. At the present moment we find a dear division upon a
technical, scientific issue between the United States Supreme Court and the higheft scien-
tific body in the radio world. See McCormack, The Regenerative Circuit Litigation (1934)
5 AiR L. Rrv. 282. The difficulty here does not grow out of a riralry between scientific and
juristic concepts, but out of a belief upon the part of the lawmen that there is a "purely
legal" issue here which is separable from the scientific issue.
23. GoRDON, Sm JAsS YouNG Snsou aD CHooroOa (1897) c. VII, and Thom-%




willing to turn away his head while some irresponsible official comforts
the victim with prayers and chicken dinners, but the jurist does not
know how to enter this transaction in his books.
There are those who believe that the legal institution would be rid of
embarrassing conflicts if only its ancient mythology could be set aside.
Still, something more than that is required. The intellectual embarrass-
ments pervading the law today are not due simply to the antiquity of the
conceptions of jurisprudence. The difficulty arises rather out of the
fact that, living in a world in which the power of scientific ways of
thinking is constantly growing, the man of law simply cannot keep clear
of psychological and sociological ideas. On the other hand, he is stub-
born about accepting those ideas as more than tools to be used when con-
venient. He feels that his fundamental aims can still be satisfactorily
dictated by philosophical conceptions that somehow stand above or apart
from the conceptions of natural science.
When we look back over intellectual history since the dawn of modern
science, we see that scientific thought has rarely accepted such arbitrary
confinement. Theologians and jurists have from the first had a notion
that the view of man and nature provided by the natural scientists could
be kept in check, that it could be rhade a mere technique of achieving
ends selected by superscientific forms of reasoning. Yet, as the years
have gone on, we have seen theological and juristic doctines being slowly
worn down and disfigured by the very intellectual instrument that was
supposed to be used for their own purposes. The nonscientific mind,
instead of gaining increasing control over nature by the mastery of the
scientific method, has found itself thrown into utter confusion.
Men talking about rugged individualism when they ought to be build-
ing houses and distributing goods, men talking about lawlessness when
they ought to be expanding the schools and training more teachers, men
talking about war as a sin when they ought to be wrestling with the
concrete sources of the emotions that make for war: these are the
typical outcomes of the prevailing social philosophy, of the philosophy
that dominates the law, of the philosophy that would subordinate the pur-
suit of truth and fact to the pursuit of so-called ideals.
Today men watch with apprehension their own increasing mastery
over physical nature. They have the uneasy feeling that they are pro-
ducing the machines that must sooner or later be used by themselves to
destroy themselves. They grow morally earnest about the situation and
write articles for the magazines. But too rarely do they bring to bear
upon this great social problem that intellectual integrity, that frankness,
that cool perspective of nature which has built the machines of war and
which is man's only hope in the control of himself. Solemn men who go
about the world preaching that there is something more to be relied
[Vol. 44
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upon than facts, that there is something more necessary to human life
than intellectual honesty, are doing what they can to prevent the world
from catching up with science.
It is true that Jeremy Bentham saw this one hundred years ago, but
the present state of affairs does not prove that Bentham's idea of a
scientific humanitarianism was impossible. It simply proves that
Bentham was more than a hundred years ahead of his time and that
the vested interest in other than scientific views of nature were still too
strong. One must admit that most of the social reform that has come
since Bentham's day has been guided by biological, psychological, and
sociological standards-by the quest for concrete and observable types
of health and happiness. The professional philosophers may have
proved to their own satisfaction that health is only relative, that nobody
can know whether he is happy, and such ideas may have been of great
aid to those who wished to block all active enterprises of social control.'
But it is fair to ask how much the world has gained by the insistence upon
these moral qualities like piety, justice, patriotism, which have an exist-
ence and glory over and above that of physical health and a sound, serene
mind. 5 There is no difficulty about such terms so long as they are
applied to acts and states that are valued for other reasons than their
names. But too often the names are used simply to make men do and
be what otherwise they would avoid. One sometimes wonders whether
we should not be better off one hundred or five hundred years from now
if we could set out with the simple objective of a maximum of bodily
health for the population of the world. War could not be tolerated be-
cause it brings death and disease, economic uncertainty could not be
tolerated because worry, besides being a disease itself, brings other
diseases in its train.
If, then, the man of law is to escape from his present confusion, he
has to chose between a philosophy completely dominated by tradition
and one made congruous with modern, natural science. Actually the
first alternative is not available and will not be available unless war or
other large-scale disaster shall drive man into a period of intellectual
paralysis. So long as the scientific way of thinking dominates engineering
and medicine, the lawmen will find it impossible to confine their own
philosophy to a logic-tight compartment. So long as science by its con-
crete achievements goes on schooling plain men in its fundamental con-
cepts, these plain men will become less and less tolerant of ideas that
are incongruous with natural science.
24. For a summary of the arguments against happiness as a social end, see I Vmnoonorr,
OurINES or HrsTrOcAL JUmSPRUDNCE (1920) c. I.
25. Bentham saw dearly how such terms are used to divert the issue from the under-
lying facts. See BE zwax, THE THEoRY Or Lxxsr.ATIoz (Ogden ed. 1931) xi-xiii
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The second alternative alone is reasonable. If men are to be given
some confidence in their enterprises of social control, they must be pro-
vided with a social philosophy which they can accept without rejecting
that philosophy of physical and biological nature that has taken such
uncompromising possession of their minds. The task is not an easy
one. It involves much more than the debunking of traditional legal
theory. The required philosophy is not something that will spontaneously
develop out of common sense, once the world is cleared of magic and
superstition. Nor is such a philosophy to be confused with the futile
declaration that all social phenomena are nothing more than energy
transformations. The cool, clean winds of skepticism must be given an
entrance into legal thinking; the naive social techniques of plain men
must, so far as they are valid, be accorded frank recognition by the
learned; and the established natural sciences must be scoured for facts
and concepts applicable to law. But more than this, there must be
continuous constructive effort to solve legal problems by the use of the
method and viewpoint of natural science.
A Revolution of Ideas
The many jurists, and laymen too, who feel that we shall be able to
solve social problems when we get around to it-that we are already
progressing surely if slowly-fail to see the enormous chasm separating
the thinking of natural science from that of social philosophy and law.
Before the dawn of modern science there must have been many sophisti-
cated men who felt that satisfactory progress was being made in conquest
of the physical world and who would have argued vigorously to protect
the existing theories of nature. Yet we see now that the technical equip-
ment of modern life could never have been produced through the simple
addition to the knowledge of the ancients of a few new items of informa-
tion. Nothing short of an intellectual revolution could have prepared the
way for engineering and medicine as we know them. It was not the
superficial notions that needed changing so much as it was the deep-
seated and emotional attitudes. Man had to accept a new universe in
which his world was an incidental speck instead of the focal point. He
had to take seriously and thoughtfully common mechanisms like wheels
and levers and falling bodies, which he had thought he had always under-
stood. He had to bring himself to violate sacred taboos by prodding into
the dead bodies of human beings. In short, modern natural science re-
quired the radical revision of a culture.
When we are assured that the present rate of change in social and
legal thinking is all that should be expected, it is fair to remind ourselves
that in the world of ideas as well as in the world of government there are
mere changes and there are revolutions. It is fair that we should ex-
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amine the present uneasiness in social thinking in order to estimate
whether that painless progress so much advocated by those who are
well satisfied with prevailing ideas is actually touching the dilemma of
our times. Let us remember again what that dilemma is. On the one
hand man's faith in the natural scientist is rapidly increasing as he sees
the scientist's ever-increasing control over the biological and physical
world. On the other hand, men's faith in social control, in law and in
the ideas that lie behind the law, is clearly faltering. The better ac-
quainted men become with the engineer and the physician, the more
skeptical they feel about the ideas of statesmen, jurists, and politicians.
There is a spreading uneasiness regarding statesmen who talk about the
payment of international debts which obviously cannot be paid, regarding
jurists who talk about law as though it were independent of human
nature, and regarding politicians who become engrossed in the application
of elastic words like bureaucracy and liberty when they might be con-
cerned about definite social adjustments. Gradually it is dawning upon
the world that the fundamental difference between the man of law and
the man of science lies in their sense of responsibility to fact.
The notion is gaining common circulation that we might do well to
transfer to our social problems that type of fidelity to fact which in other
realms has been so profitable. But such a transfer is a serious matter.
Social philosophy of today, like the natural philosophy of the mediaeval
churchman, is more than a collection of facts and principles to which the
scientific method will merely need to make additions and corrections.
The entire outlook of the philosophy needs to be changed. Such a
venerable distinction as that between moral and natural causes will have
to be uprooted. It will be necessary to realize that the coolest calculation
of a criminal is as much a natural phenomenon as is the convulsion of the
epileptic.2 6 It will be necessary to set aside the question as to who is
deserving of our hatred and of substituting the question as to what, as
a matter of fact, can be done to increase our control over human behavior.
The idea that every man (or almost every man) lives as he wishes in
a world of his own choosing which he may leave or return to upon his
own volition will have to be replaced by an adequate understanding of the
actual relationships between the individual and his social environment.
For natural science both individualism and blameworthiness as usually
understood are not simply unproved hypotheses-they are fictions which
are in such flagrant contradiction to the facts that they are a constant
barrier to clear thinking about social problems.
26. The conceptual machinery with which the law attempts to handle the criminal
is about two hundred years behind the modem science of criminology. See, for examp!a,
GAULT, CmIkINoLOGY (1932) c. H1, and HAGERTY, TwvENTxEF Cm-rurY CRn-ECETEE:rH
CENTURY M YTODS OF CONTROL (1934).
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Obviously no such revolution has yet taken place. Our technique of
social control is largely dominated by a theory of independent agents
making free choices in a moral world. Even in the case of international
law and negotiation there is the underlying assumption that large politi-
cal groups have the power to make choices between good and evil and
that such groups are suspectible to the threat of being blamed for bad
behavior. It may be fair to ask, therefore, what reason there is to dis-
cuss a revolution that would have to wrench loose such solidly established
ideas and attitudes.
The answer is simply this: Throughout Europe and America men are
becoming increasingly conscious of the inadequacy of prevailing social
philosophy as a guide to the practical problems of social control. Karl
Marx and Jeremy Bentham saw a century ago that such control would
ultimately have to rely upon the sense of fact that dominates natural
science.17  Throughout the Nineteenth Century and up until the present
day there have been scholars who have demonstrated with ever-increasing
conviction the possibility of applying the scientific method to history,
politics, and economics. But the influence of the scholars has thus far
been limited. The sociologist has given us a solid factual foundation for
the understanding and control of that pathological phenomenon, "the
gang," but as yet there has been no widespread and serious effort to deal
with this problem except in terms of the conventional techniques by
means of which we try to frighten potential public enemies. Neverthe-
less, the sphere of influence of the scholar is gradually widening. Even
the barber, while cutting one's hair, gives a Tugwellian lecture upon the
futility of trying to starve our way to prosperity in a world of plenty.
Everywhere one finds plain men who see that the old social theories have
little to do with facts and needs.
Now this is exactly the setting for a revolution. The old ideas seem
still to be in the saddle. Even where as a matter of social practice we
have come to act in response to the facts, the old formulas have to be
stretched to fit. But there is a limit to the stretching. Men may be
relied upon to act one way and to talk another only until they discover
a more honest way of talking. They may be relied upon to maintain
the old verbal customs only so long as those customs do not present a
definite barrier to their aspirations. When they become aware of a
philosophy which will permit them to speak frankly and directly, the
adoption of this new way of thinking is likely to come abruptly.
27. It is sometimes said that Marx and Bentham are to be discounted because their
views of science were oversimplified. But this was only because they accepted the general
theory of the natural science of their time. Their fundamental idea that social philosophy
should be consistent with natural science has not met refutation.
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The Fly-Wheel of Society
Change of any kind in human life is opposed by the inertia of habit.
"Habit," said William James, "is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society,
its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within
the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the
envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most
repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread
therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deckhand at sea through the
winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to
his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it
prevents us from invasion by the natives of the desert and from the frozen
zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our
nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that dis-
agrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too
late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing.
Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism
settling down on the young commercial traveler, on the young doctor,
on the young minister, on the young counsellor-at-law. You see the little
lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought,
the prejudices, the ways of the 'shop' in a word, from which the man can
by-and-by no more escape than his coat sleeve can suddenly fall into a
new set of folds. On the whole, it is best that he should not escape. It
is well for the world that in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character
has set like plaster, and will never soften again."2
There is no doubt about this safety factor in the inertia of habit. The
anthropologists have described social catastrophies brought about by the
too sudden changing of the habits of a people.20 It might seem therefore
that all radical changes in behavior or in intellectual outlook are fraught
with danger and that the only sane way to handle changes that are in-
evitable is to prevent their occurring too swiftly. It might seem always
the part of wisdom to turn threatened revolution into benign evolution.
The belief that the best protection against the shock of social change
lies in the tactics of conservatism is widely held and widely represented
in political and in educational practice. But the difficulty with this belief
is that it considers every social change as something to be dealt with as
an isolated phenomenon. It assumes that the sudden legislative relief
of farm debtors must have been hard upon the characters of the farmers.
There was general recognition that something had to be done for the
agricultural debtor, but there was a feeling that, whatever was done, it
28. 1 JAmmXs, PRnxiPLEs or PsYCHoLoGY 121. Quoted by permislon of the publ-her,
Henry Holt and Company.
29. See Prrr-rns, TEE CLAsH oF CuLTU S, (London, 1927).
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must not change the debtor's status too suddenly. In dealing with the
bankrupt farmer it was felt that we ought to remember what happened
when the white man suddenly bestowed fire water upon his red brother.
It is clear that legal steps taken during nineteen thirty-three and
thirty-four have altered radically the lines of financial relationship be-
tween the productive groups in our population. There is the possibility
that a whole series of social maladjustments may follow. Our present
point, however, is simply this: the sheer speed of these changes is no
criterion of their desirability or undesirability. The speed with which
mortgage moratoria and agricultural bonuses were adopted must be
evaluated in terms of the speed with which other social changes were
taking place. How rapidly and completely were the industrial producers
losing their markets because of the collapse in the financial status of the
farmer? How rapidly was the farmer losing his loyalty to established
political institutions? Such questions as these must be brought into
view when one considers whether in a given case it would have been
better slowly to have worn down the resistance of habit or whether it
was, after all, necessary, considering what other uncontrollable changes
were taking place, to have torn up a few habits by the roots.
We may look upon the intellectual habits of a people as though they
represented a military line on the defensive. So long as there is an
orderly retreat in the face of slow but even pressure, little harm is done.
This is the picture the conservative likes to draw of our relinquishment
of old customs. But if the pressure upon one part of the line brings
about a pronounced retreat at that point, failure of the remainder of the
line to fall back creates the gravest danger. The more stubbornly the
forward segment maintains its position, the more likelihood there is that
the whole line will become broken and disorganized. Resistance itself
is no longer a safety factor.
Now the onrush of modern natural science has had a devastating effect
upon our habitual ways of looking at the physical and even the biological
world. Unless we go back and read the natural histories of the ancients
it is difficult to realize how many long-established intellectual habits had
to be given up before the advance of modern science. But there is a
stretch of the cultural line where resistance still is very stubborn. Al-
though we have given up the theory that cursing at a broken machine
or a sick horse does any good, it is still a prevailing habit to assume that
the economic policies of nations, the business practices of bankers, and the
aggressions of gangsters can be brought under control by such tactics.
Our present culture presents to its environment a broken line. If the
natural sciences should lose their present influence, if we could return
superstition, animism, spiritualism and other primitive attitudes to their
former dominant position, we might restore some sort of equilibrium.
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This is the move suggested by those who believe that farmers should
return to nonmechanical production and that we can best preserve our
old ideas about distributing goods by keeping down the amount that we
have to distribute. Another possibility is that the gap between scientific
and social thinking will lead inevitably to a collapse of our civilization.
This is the lugubrious prediction of some observers who cannot conceive
of our ever attaining a fact-minded attitude toward social phenomena
and who also feel that we shall not be able to prevent the physical
sciences from creating insoluble social problems. But there is the third
possibility that the highly resistant habits of social interpretation will give
ground suddenly, thus creating a new alignment of ideas. Certainly
such a retreat from the old ways of thinking is greatly to be desired and
should not be resisted simply upon the grounds that habits ought always
to be changed slowly. In this case the very integrity of society may
depend upon a change that is swift and decisive2
A Vested Interest in the Old Ideas
The general line of cleavage between social philosophy and the philoso-
phy of natural science reaches down, as we have seen, into the mentality
of common men and children. Yet the more intricate elaboration and
the more difficult application of these philosophies is in the hands of
special groups of men. The lawyers, whether judges, counsellors or
scholars, represent the dominant social philosophy of our day. When,
therefore, we consider the possibility of radical changes in social philoso-
phy, we must look at the lawmen and consider whether, as men go, they
are conservative or progressive.
The general verdict is clear. Central to all their doctrines is the
principle that habit and custom are the most valid criteria of truthP1
There are dissenters, of course, who believe that legal thinking should
spend more time looking forward to social results and less time looking
backward upon the precedents, but there is no question about the domi-
nance of the retrospective view. Around this type of interpretation there
has grown up a tremendous literature of past decisions in the use of
which the neophyte is drilled. In such a formula, in such a literature,
and in such a process of initiation the lawcraft has naturally developed
30. That the violent social disturbances associated with political revolution have been
due to the stubborn defense of outworn ideas and customs is well developed by A.ms,
THEoRY oF SOciAL RFvOLUTI OS (1913), and by SouLE, Ta= Co=rG A caI.C,. Pmr0m-
TioN (1934).
31. It is sometimes said that the conservatism of the lawyer is largely due to the fact
that much of his effort is expended in protecting men of property. See WXLu-ts, PrM.;cr-
P or SocrAL PsyCHoLOcY (1922) c. XVI. But the hold of custom upon thought is
certainly based upon something far more fundamental than the position of a social cas-.
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a vested interest. When the suggestion is made that legal problems are
at bottom problems of psychology, sociology, or economics and that the
law student ought to be trained to analyze social situations in such terms,
the lawman smiles sadly and says that too little time is now available
for the mastery of the "regular" technique of the profession. He means,
of course, that there can never be anything quite so important about a
social problem as what John Marshall would have thought about it had
he met the situation a hundred years ago. How the problem might look
when viewed in terms of recent psychological, sociological, or economic
investigation is conceived to be merely a secondary question.2
The lawyers are a priesthood with a prestige to maintain. They must.
have a set of doctrines that do not threaten to melt away with the ad-
vances of psychological and social science. It is desirable for them to
maintain a logic that seems to the laymen subtle and difficult to grasp.
They must, in order to feel socially secure, believe and convince the out-
side world that they have peculiar techniques requiring long study to
master. In a way they have overplayed this card. Even laymen are
coming to see that if The Law were as difficult to understand as the
profession implies, nobody would ever be able to become a lawyer.
There is nothing immoral or insincere about this tendency of legal
theory to support the status of the legal profession. It has been typical
of priestly and professional groups throughout human history to empha-
size the uniqueness and importance of their knowledge. Recognition
upon the part of the priests and professionals that theirs is an intellectual
policy of deception and mystification has probably been rare. As a
rule the sense of fidelity to fact is simply a minor factor in such situa-
tions. We should hardly expect the young magician or medicine man to
question the factual validity of the rituals and incantations he is taught.
It is enough if he catch the dramatic congruity of his role with the larger
life of the community. Indeed, if we go back only a few years in the
history of modern medicine we shall find much the same psychological
32. ". . . It is doubtless of the utmost importance to know the actual conditions under
which a legal rule is to be applied. But it cannot be too strongly insisted that the knowl-
edge of such social conditions belongs to economics, or to some branch of descriptive
social science. Law is a method of regulating social action, and the science of law has a
content over and above that met in the knowledge of actual conditions." Morris Cohen,
Law and the Scientific Method, LAW AND THE SOcIAL ORDER (1933) 184, 189. See also
(1928) 6 Amr. L. REv. 231. Obviously law is not identical with economics, sociology, or
psychology, but insistence upon its over-and-aboveness has tended to insulate it from
those very facts most needed in the design of effective social control.
Even an essentially liberal jurist like Professor Hessel E. Yntema seems to accept con-
ventional legal scholarship as a "practical" obligation which leaves little energy for tho
factual investigation of human disputes. Yntema, Legal Science and Reform (1934) 34
COL. L. Ra,. 207, at 220.
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phenomenon. Drugs and surgical procedures that we now know could
not have cured disease were used by generation after generation of
physicians. The technique of blood-letting, for instance, was a long
established symbol of doctoral behavior. The public expected it, and
the doctors had elaborate theories to explain its efficacy. That bleed-ing, together with its largely erroneous theories, should have survived so
long was due, not to the fact that the doctors were fooling the public
in order to make a living, but because of certain dramatic congruities
that were being maintained. There was something altogether fitting
about a doctor opening a blood vessel and this fitness was as welcome to
a public that had a desperate craving to believe in doctors as it was to
the doctors themselves.
When we take a psychological rather than a moral view of the legal
profession, we are able to understand why lawyers, who are, as a rule,
as honest as other men, can develop and maintain theories of social
control that are so largely lacking in factual validity. Recall, for
example, the notion that even large minorities can be made to obey laws
they do not like until a majority of votes can be obtained for repeal. The
theory has almost nothing to do with the democratic process as it has
actually operated and there is almost no reason to believe that democ-
racies will ever operate that way. Or consider the theory that the
courts are at the service of the people. Actually, of course, the courts
are available in proportion to one's ability to pay for their use, but
legal theory has little to say about this stark reality.P Nevertheless
these doctrines give a certain dramatic congruity to legal and political
life which has an obvious appeal to the public as well as to the lawyers.
If their factual validity is attacked, many lawyers will rush to their
defense. Some will say shamelessly that the theories are not intended
to be accounts of fact. They are rather the expression of ideals and
hopes. Psychologically their appeal is akin to that of the wild dancing
and drum-beating by means of which the primitive doctor seeks to drive
away the evil spirits inhabiting the sick, or the dark-colored and evil-
smelling concoctions with which other physicians have sought to accom-
plish the same result. When people are terribly depressed by the
suffering of their kin, the first urge is that something vigorous be done
and the first test of the fitness of what is done is almost sure to lie at the
level of emotional satisfaction. In the present state of political and legal
thinking, it is far more necessary to say something that is emotionally
satisfying than something that is true.
33. The lawmen know that the courts are accessible only to those able to bear the
expense of litigation, but legal theory treats this fact as an unfortunate accident rather




In short, the lawyers constitute a conservative force balking the ad-
vance of social thinking. This conservatism appears in the dominant
theme of the law-in the principle that the concurrence of a judge with
his predecessors is a direct test of the validity of his decision. No one
would question the value of historical knowledge in the solution of social
problems, but the doctrine of precedent in law is something more than a
responsibility to history. It is a custom, not only of knowing what
others have thought, but also of thinking that way oneself. It is a habit
of mind in which a stupidity may be perpetuated on the grounds that it
is well-established.
In an age when man's thought is constantly turned toward the future
by the clear promises of change offered by natural science, it may seem
remarkable that legal thinking should have maintained an essentially
conservative logic. One factor in this conservatism has been the associa-
tion between legal doctrine and the status of a social group. In general
the better organized and the more self-conscious a professional group
becomes, the more resistant it becomes to new ways of thinking. If it is
admitted that psychology and sociology are as important as is legal cus-
tom in the administration of criminal justice, it becomes apparent that
the conventionally trained lawyer is in danger of losing a privileged
position. One remembers how at one time conventional medicine was
so resistant to the intrusion of surgery that the latter had to be developed
as a separate profession.
Finally, it is worth noting that the public itself has other impulses
than that of being right in the scientific sense. The public has some
liking for a law that expresses hopes and ideals, even if these be unrealiz-
able. As we have earlier remarked, the lawyers probably overestimate
the demand for merely emotional congruities, just as the theologians long
overestimated the desire upon the part of laymen to believe in miracles.
Nevertheless this fear upon the part of the lawyers of departing too
abruptly from popular impulses is one of the powerful elements in main-
taining legal conservatism.
The Arguments of Conservatism
It has become a commonplace of everyday thinking that the psycho-
logical forces which determine the side we are to take in an argument
are not identical with the reasons we advance in favor of our position.
There are the real reasons and the good reasons. When we speak of the
habitual logic of the lawyers, of their desire to maintain their priestly
status, and of their sense of obligation to other values than that of truth,
we are not repeating arguments advanced by the lawyers themselves. It
would never do for a group to say that it is conservative because it is
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used to being so, or that it is afraid to offend popular opinion, even when
that opinion is manifestly wrong. Yet juristic conservatism has been
under vigorous attack from within and without the profession and there
has been a necessity for argumentative resistance.
The first argument of conservatism is that truth about society and
social institutions is likely to be disconcerting and even dangerous. Un-
varnished facts ought not be presented without consideration of their
psychological effects upon the people.
When one applies the attitude of natural science to an area previously
dominated by merely plausible and authoritarian doctrines, the first
effect is typically destructive. It is frequently impossible to develop a
valid interpretation of a social problem until old doctrines have been
undermined. In a fact-minded study of the law it may be necessary
to show that a jury trial is primarily a resolution of an emotional conflict
-that it is concerned only secondarily with the fitting of the law to the
facts. Similarly it may be necessary to show that the ablest judges are
only human beings and that, despite our yearning for a superhuman jus-
tice, laws are never expressed except through men. Such critical con-
clusions are actually disturbing to the student and the practitioner who
are bent upon knowing what the law really is. And, if such persons
accept these critical conclusions they are likely, at least for a time, to
feel baffled and skeptical about the entire legal institution. One charge
against the application of scientific method to the study of social control
is, then, that it tends, if too vigorously pursued, to lead to skepticism.
We all remember how, a generation ago, there was a good deal of ner-
vousness about the influence of philosophical and biological study upon
religious beliefs and we all remember that there frequently was a period
of disturbance for the boy brought up in orthodox surroundings and then
suddenly introduced to the theory of evolution. But the men of science
did not go easy on their students. Instead the religious influences became
altered. Students are today less shocked by science because they no
longer are inculcated with theological beliefs which have to be uprooted.
We may conclude that the development of legal study will probably fol-
low a similar course. Criticism of old beliefs in terms of the facts will
hardly be restricted. Instead, this criticism will become such an estab-
lished part of legal education and of popular ideas of social engineering,
that it will no longer be disturbing.
It is a basic tenet of the scientific mode of life that the truth is always
to be pursued and expressed without regard to the comfort of those who
have found security in fictions. That the universe was made expresfly
for man seemed less plausible after the Copernican theory had shown
that the earth is not at the center even of the solar system. And in
those days earnest men who accepted the new astronomical theory were
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troubled by its possible effects upon the public at large. Some three
hundred years later other earnest men saw a serious problem in the
possible influence of the theory of evolution. There seemed to be no
small likelihood that such a theory would unsettle established religious
beliefs. In our own day the Freudian theory with its insistence upon
the dominating and ubiquitous character of the sexual impulse has again
caused men to wonder whether the new knowledge may not destroy
indispensable fictions. But in all of these cases science has pressed
onward. It has been a part of the scientific movement to restrain the
misinterpretation of new facts, but never to restrain the collection and
dissemination of the facts themselves. And it is significant that in the
modern world this fearlessness on the part of science as to the conse-
quences of new knowledge has always prevailed.
That the body of legal opinion is still essentially resistant to a thor-
oughgoing scientific attack upon the problems of social control is no-
where clearer than in the failure of the law men to accept the princi-
ple that discovery of the truth is the main objective of thinking and
that a fiction is never to be regarded as better than a fact. There is a
widespread feeling among the general public that law ought to be definite
and that its application ought to be swift and certain. 4 Now every
lawyer knows that the law is far less definite than laymen believe and
that its pitfalls are so many that lawyers can ill afford to run the risks
of speed. The scientific approach to such a situation would require fur-
ther open-minded inquiry into the types and sources of legal uncertainty
and contradiction and the widespread dissemination of the factual re-
sults. The public sometimes likes to think that the courts are logical
if only one understands them well enough. There is a popular belief
also shared by many jurists that past decisions on a point of law must fit
into a logical pattern. Yet one of the most obvious and psychologically
most understandable conclusions to be drawn from any mass of decisions
upon a reasonably subtle point is that the judges are constantly con-
tradicting themselves and each other. The white men were often shocked
to find that the American Indian was willing to take on the Christian
Religion without discarding his own. According to a certain kind of
so-called logic there seems to be an impossibility about the holding of
contradictory beliefs, but psychologically there is nothing more easily
understood. Every normal person harbors contradictory beliefs and
desires without ever making final settlement of the issue between them.
Similarly it is perfectly natural that a judge should now decide a case in
this way and then reverse himself under insignificant changes in sur-
34. This is what Jerome Frank calls the "basic myth" of the law. See FRuMN', LAW
AND no MODERN Mnm (1930) 3.
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rounding circumstances. When we consider groups of judges, such
contradictions are even more to be expected. Freud has emphasized the
long established fact that the inner life of the individual is always full
of conflict and contradiction and that we can deal with psychological prob-
lems only by admitting this fact. A scientific approach to law would
admit that such a complex institution as the law is also full of normal
conflicts and that the competent understanding and use of the law will
be dependent upon an understanding of the nature of the conflicts
within it.
But such an attitude is intolerable to many of the legal profession.
When directly confronted with the fact that the law does not operate
logically, these members of the profession will admit conflict and contra-
diction but say that it is not as important as the law's consistency.
Such, however, is not the point. Of course the judges sometimes agree.
Probably they agree more often than not. But their disagreements
constitute one of their most important types of behavior. They are
more than accidents that merely have to be explained away. If it were
not for the reality of the disagreements there would be no appellate courts
and little of what today goes under the name of legal learning."
The unwillingness of the lawmen to face the fact of conflict within
their institution is well illustrated by the philosophy behind one of the
most ambitious and costly professional efforts of modern times. Weighted
down by the obligation to make the law as certain as laymen and naive
practitioners wish to have it, an imposing group of legal experts met in
Washington in 1923 and organized the American Law Institute. It was
the design of this Institute to foster the codification by expert commit-
tees of the principal chapters of that law which according to Anglo-
American theory is supposed to reside in the accumulated decisions
of the courts. If a batch of cases should seem to point in two or more
directions it was planned that the experts should themselves decide what
the law really is. They were not to publish argumentative support for
their conclusions since that might again resurrect the very uncertainty
which the Institute was seeking to squelch. In other words an effort was
to be made to take the cases-one of the finest existing records of that
fickle creature, man-and to remake them into a logical system within
35. There is obviously little use in debating the question as to whether legal rules are
or are not certain. Some are relatively certain; others are relatively uncertain. But legal
theory is too inclined to hold that uncertainty is an accident rather than a fundamental
feature of the law. How many law students are frankly taught that uncertainty in the
rules as well as in the facts is practically a prerequisite for litigation? SLe Dickia-on,




the reach of the average intelligence of average lawyers.80 Actually
the result thus far secured is hideously difficult. There is some reason
to believe that it would be easier and more satisfactory to learn law by
random sampling of the cases with all their contradictions and complexi-
ties than by reading the abstract propositions in the volumes issued by
the Institute.3
7
Our main interest, however, is in the general philosophy of the under-
taking, which is plainly founded upon the belief that too much truth
about the law is disastrously confusing and that the remedy may be found
in an authoritative suppression of the facts rather than in better educa-
tion of the public and the bar as to the actual psychological and sociolog-
ical nature of the law. Religious teachers thought that men would find
it simpler to lead a good life if they were given a mythical picture of
human nature-if they were told, for instance, that good men do not
even think about sensuous pleasures. And so the American Law Insti-
tute has thought that it can help simple-minded lawyers by giving an
artificial and arbitrary picture of the principles in terms of which human
disputes are supposed to be settled. No one could have expressed the
position better than Chief Justice Hughes (who in many other respects
is not rockbound). Replying to critics of the undertaking,"8 the learned
Justice spoke as follows:
"... The law is not an end in itself; it does not exist simply for the play
of wits. The law governs the relations of men and women in an ordered
society. They are entitled, so far as is humanly possible, to know the rules
that govern them and to have these rules applied consistently. Clarity and
certainty are thus desirable ends, but they cannot be attained even measur-
ably without cooperative efforts, in and out of courts, which seek to develop
a coherent jurisprudence. The authority of the Institute is the authority of
a cooperative effort of the most intelligent and expert sort. It stands opposed
to mere impressionism. The Restatement will foster analysis rather than dis-
place it. It will promote examination of principles, rather than discourage it.
It will tend to diminish the careless use of digests and cyclopedias. Focussing
attention on definite propositions, it cannot fail to facilitate discussion and
improvement." 39
36. "The American Law Institute, organized at Washington in 1923, is the first co-
operative endeavor by all the groups engaged in the development of law to grapple
with the monster of uncertainty and slay him." CA~mozo, THE GRowTH or Ta LAW
(1924) 6.
37. The first volumes of the restatement of the common law to be completed were
those on Contracts published by American Law Institute Publishers, 1932. Torts, Con-
flict of Laws, Property, Business Associations, Trusts, and Criminal Procedure are In
various stages of completion.
38. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 643. Another
skeptical reviewer is Pollock, Book Review (1933) 47 HARv. L. Rxv. 363.
39. Chief Justice Hughes, (1933) A. B. A. J. 325, 326.
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The attitude is definite. Law is more than something to be honest
about. It is something to live by. A feeling of certainty and clarity
is worth achieving even if it calls for an authoritative forgetting of
human disagreements. Legal analysis is not to be hindered by the new
code, but such analysis will be better if carried on deductively. What
is primarily needed as a basis for analysis is a set of definite and co-
herent propositions."
We would not suggest that a sound knowledge of the law can be
built up without the tentative and exploratory use of general proposi-
tions. There remains, however, the essential question as to the test
to which these propositions are to be submitted. In natural science it
is held that a good hypothesis must be definite as to the fact-knowledge
required to support or refute it. The scientific hypothesis is not designed
to comfort uncertain minds or to achieve conviction by authoritarian
sanction. It aims rather at setting a definite problem, the solution of
which is to come only from factual inquiry.
Such bodies of logically consistent doctrines as those formulated by
the experts of the American Law Institute are obviously not to be con-
sidered as efforts to understand the legal institution as it is. When one
considers these "restatements" of the common law and how they are
being formulated, one remembers how the expert theologians got to-
gether in the Council of Nicaea and decided by a vote the nature of the
Trinity. There is a difference between the two occasions. The church
fathers had far more power than does the Law Institute to enforce belief
in their conclusion.
The Is and the Ought
It has not escaped the jurists that modern legal knowledge is pat-
terned after mediaeval theology rather than after natural science. In-
stead of attempting to argue away the preeminence in law of authority
and coherence and the merely secondary status of fact, they claim that
jurisprudence and natural science have very different aims. In answer to
those realists who would turn jurisprudence into a natural science, Dean
Pound has commented as follows:
".. .But it should be borne in mind that jurisprudence must consider not
merely how judges do decide but how they ought to decide to give effect to
the purposes of the legal order, not only how the legal order actually takes
place but how it should go forward. Psychology may be of aid in clarifying
the manner in which justice is administered but this cannot dispense with the
40. We intend no prophecy that a restatement of the common law "will not worh."
If courts gradually accept its propositions as equivalent to a precedent, of course it will
work. But we could hardly conclude on such grounds that these propositions had ba
validated as general principles of legal behavior-as principles of a science of jurisprudence.
19341
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question of how justice ought to be administered. This question of ought
turning ultimately on the theory of values is the most difficult one in juris-
prudence. Those who long for an exact science analogous to mathematics,
physics or astronomy are inclined to seek exactness by excluding this problem
from jurisprudence altogether. But such a jurisprudence has only an illusion
of reality; the significant question is the one excluded." 4'
We may set aside the point that the scientific view of law promises an
accuracy it cannot achieve. Science promises only such accuracy as
it actually achieves. What science does promise is uncompromising
honesty. But Dean Pound's contention that emphasis upon the is
tends toward the neglect of the ought deserves more serious attention.
Certainly the detailed scientific examination of any group of natural
phenomena is characteristically disturbing to conventional judgments
about those phenomena. Certainly, too, the scientific exploration of
an area in which conventional judgments have previously dominated
cannot successfully be made without holding those moral judgments at
least temporarily in check. But we are left with the question whether
the result of scientific inquiry in a traditionally moral realm is to elin-
inate moral judgments there or to render them permanently uncertain,
lukewarm, and ineffective. Is Science a jealous mistress who will tol-
erate no trifling with Morality upon the part of her admirers? Or is
the opposition merely relative and temporary?
Not so many years ago the moral judgment was confidently made
that persons suffering from manic excitement ought to be violently sub-
dued. The presence of such a person in a community naturally aroused
a good deal of ignorant fear which was relieved just in proportion to
the physical violence with which the psychotic was handled. In the
course of time men of calmer temper had the courage to set aside the
customary moral estimate of the mentally deranged and to survey the
facts. Gradually these facts made an impression upon the public and
gradually the public came to appreciate the essential folly of its former
valuation. From our present vantage point it seems as though the
encroachment of the naturalistic attitude in thig case brought nothing
but moral gain. We may nevertheless imagine something of the trepida-
tion with which conservatives saw the old values tottering and giving
way. They must have felt that society was losing its firm grip upon a
vital situation-that hard-headedness was giving way to sentimentality.
Present-day criminology and penology furnish a similar picture, though
in this case we are in the stage of moral unsettlement rather than in
that of a new moral valuation. The public would rather do vicious and
often useless things to criminals than admit that its judgments about
41. Pound, Jurisprudence (1932) 8 ENcYc. Soc. ScIENcEs 477, at 489.
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the criminal problem are incorrect; yet men of science continue to
accumulate evidence that deterrence and cure have no simple and direct
relationship to the severity of punishment and there are already many
signs that the old values are losing certainty.
A primary source of these anxieties about the moral life, which are
so frequently associated with any intellectual advance, lies in a super-
ficial understanding of the nature of moral judgments. There is a
failure to see that moral judgments are themselves conclusions regard-
ing the facts and that, wherever there are widely accepted facts, the
moral values will be brought into line with them. To assume that
natural science typically takes a purely passive view of nature is to for-
get that scientists have typically been men seeking the good life. As
Maurice Hindus has so brilliantly shown, the Bolsheviks, though they
have attempted to discard all social beliefs that do not meet the- tests
of scientific validity, are yet more conscious of moral values than is
the average member of a conventional western community. Their
values, are, of course, very different, but they are no less commanding.
The period of moral uncertainty is not the product of an over-emphasis
upon truth and a neglect of right; it is simply a symptom of a period
during which fact-knowledge is being revised. Nor is moral uncertainty
to be satisfactorily cured by isolating it from that attitude of objectivity
in which matters of truth are most reliably estimated. Its cure lies
only in pushing forward until new and more reliable knowledge of fact
can fully replace older presumptions and superstitions. There is no
way of stepping beyond the reach of the critical phases of naturalistic
understanding and waiting until old moral certainties can be replaced
by new ones. The painful transitions must be borne."
Moral judgments are judgments of what ought to be done about some-
thing, but how can they be dissociated from the nature of the something!
We are as sure today of the desirability of humane treatment of the
insane as men were two hundred years ago of the need for the torture
of revolving chairs and straight jackets. But this change is not to be
looked upon as a merely parallel development in the facts on the one
hand and in moral values on the other. At every step the scientific and
the moral have been interwoven. If there was a period during which
men were doubtful as to whether they ought to treat the insane as sick
or as possessed, that was a period when there was some doubt about
the facts.
If the shrinking from a naturalistic study of legal institutions is based
42. Humus, Hu-uu= UPROOTE (1929).
43. This transition period is hard on pedagogues, because it reduces their faith in th-
old subject-matter faster than it produces new supplies. Teachers often remain cosmarvatv
simply in order to give ample content to their courses.
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upon the fear that there will be a period during which verifiable posi-
tive knowledge will hardly equal in detail the traditions that the new
attitude will overthrow, then that shrinking has good historical basis.
But there is no other way of attaining an improved set of values as
to what courts ought to do than that of going through a period during
which we thoroughly discredit many of the things courts have been
thought to do. There will be a period, too, during which the positive
facts uncovered will be scattered and poorly understood-a period during
which we shall have less confidence in our judgments of the oughts of
law than men used to have.
Yet there is reason to believe that the period of less certain opinion
as to facts and therefore of less certain moral judgments will be no more
hazardous a transition than many another that men have undergone.
Wise Christians once thought that all moral judgments rest upon a
literal interpretation of the scriptures. But the refutation of that doc-
trine was negotiated with relatively little social upheaval. Men went
on making moral judgments even when they were personally troubled
as to the consequences of the higher criticism.
There is even the possibility that the public's present attitudes toward
the law have little of that confidence which legal scholars are afraid to
see disturbed. There is evidence that the common man already discounts
to a large degree the authority and certainty of the courts. Thus, a
pushing forward with critical and naturalistic studies of legal behavior
is not likely to be upsetting to him. He is already in the stage of moral
uncertainty because he does not know what to think about the law.
It has required no unmoral science but only common observation to show
him that there is a great discrepancy between what courts do and what
they talk about."' But it will require a determined intellectual effort to
supply him with a fresh and objective description of legal institutions
in order that he may have the materials upon which to base a set of
confident moral judgments about the law. Give him facts that are clearly
valid, and we need have no fear lest he gradually come into a completely
neutral state regarding legal issues. He may decide that trial courts
as we have known them ought to be abolished, that the analogical argu-
mentation from the cases ought to be severely restricted and revised, that
the law ought not to go on pretending that, whereas a psychotic criminal
is a member of the natural universe, a sane criminal exists on an entirely
ethical plane. And if a naturalistic jurisprudence finally gives him the
facts upon which confidently to base such judgments, we may be sure
44. It has been shown by MAr, owsxi, Cpm&E AND CusTom in SAVAOa Socxinr (1926)
that even primitive people are capable of taking a tentative, sophisticated, evasive attitude
toward their own laws.
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that those judgments will have all of the vitality and force possessed by
the morality of old 5
Leadership or Decay
Despite anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, economists, and
other academic persons who have made a genuine effort to apply the
scientific method to the social world, the social philosophy that is actually
expressed in public policy is that of the men of law. But there is no
reason to believe that this condition will hold indefinitely. Indeed, we
have tried to show that, as the gap between naturalistic (scientific) and
social thought becomes more and more obvious, we approach a time
when legalistic theories of the social process will inevitably be given up.
Even the plain man is already uneasy in the presence of these incom-
patible ways of thinking and as this feeling increases he will be forced
to relegate the juristic concepts that have hitherto dominated his social
thinking to that realm of antiquities to which he has already dismissed
the Scholastic and Calvinistic theologies. 0
45. Compare with this discussion the pointed statement by Llewellyn, Some Realism
about Realsm (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, at 1236:
"... whereas value judgments must always be appealed to in order to set objectives
for inquiry, yet during the inquiry itself into what i% the observation, the description,
and the establishment of relations between the things described are to remain as largdy
as possible uncontaminated by the desires of the observer or by what he wishes might
be or thinks ought (ethically) to be. More particularly, this involves during the study
of what courts are doing the effort to disregard the question what they ought to do.
Such divorce of Is and Ought is, of course, not conceived as permanent. To men who
begin with a suspicion that change is needed, a permanent divorce would be impoz ble.
The argument is simply that no judgment of what Ought to be done in the future with
respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without knowing objectively, a3
far as possible, what that part of law is now doing. And realists believe that experience
shows the intrusion of Ought-spectacles during the investigation of the facts make it
very difficult to see what is being done. On the Ought side this means an insistence on
informed evaluations instead of armchair speculations. Its full implications on the Side
of Is-Investigation can be appreciated only when one follows the contributions to objective
description in business law and practice made by realists whose social philosophy rejects
many of the accepted foundations of the e.isting economic order."
For a more general discussion of this problem, see Weiss, Value as an Objective Problem
in Psychology (1932) 27 J. ABNopMAL AND Soc. PsYcar. 111.
46. The contrast between the sociological and the legal attack upon crime is well Illus-
trated by a recent statement by Tenement House Commis~ioner Langdon W. Post, N. Y.
Times, July 30, 1934:
"Behind the Dillingers and the Diamonds, the Gerald Chapmans and the Pretty Boy
Floyds there stands the slum. As long as we leave it there we make a very futile gsture
indeed when we pass out sawed-off shotguns to our policemen, tighten our laws, hand out
longer sentences and generally concern ourselves with the problem at only one end, the
suppression of the finished criminal. His suppression is necessary and should be vigorous,
but sooner or later we must come face to face with the great question of the forces which
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This might be taken to be a prophecy of the decay of the legal pro-
fession; and such a result is quite within the bounds of possibility. Prac-
tically all recent advances in criminology have been made by psychiatrists
and sociologists. Juristic thinkers, when confronted with the problem
of crime, seem unable to get an idea on the subject. They fill the
air with moral indignation. They talk about the alacrity with which bad
men are hanged in England, but they seem unable to say anything of
importance on the subject unless they escape from the law and talk
psychiatry and sociology. As a group the lawyers view recent govern-
mental developments with alarm. They say that they are afraid of
bureaucracy, but it is fairly easy to see that they fear that the solution
of commercial, industrial, and agricultural problems will be passed over
to men technically trained in these fields who will act with little regard
for the concepts and phrases of jurisprudence. They see too plainly
that the legal learning in which they have a vested interest is in very
real danger of losing its market value.
It is not, of course, inevitable that the legal profession should gradu-
ally decay as social pressure requires the services of psychiatrists, eco-
nomists, and other technical men. There is the possibility that, in the
face of this pressure, legal theory itself will change and that lawyers
will develop a new conception of the task of social engineering. We
have seen that such a transition is not easy for a profession which has
so long identified its social prestige with its conventional habits of
thought, but rising social demands are in the end very likely to be
served. Some of the more progressive schools of law are already turn-
ing out graduates whose fundamental attack upon social problems is that
of the economist rather than that of the jurist. But there is thus far an
insufficient realization that this is only a hint of what the future is
likely to require. Even in such schools we still find prevailing the idea
that economics, psychiatry, and the rest are merely techniques that up-to-
date lawyers must learn to use. This frequently results in much con-
fusion. The man who has secured an economic or psychological grasp
upon a legal problem is not quite willing to go clear through along that
line of thought. Observers of many of the recent governmental hear-
ings in connection with industrial and agricultural adjustments have
reported a tendency even for the more progressive men to retreat, under
fire, into the old jungles of legal dialectic, where obviously desirable social
objectives become logical impossibilities.
And yet the men of law still have before them the opportunity to be-
priginally start the criminal on his anti-social path. New York's slums have now been
demonstrated as a principal one of these forces, and their elimination should go forward
with all the zeal an informed citizenry is capable of bringing into play."
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come leaders in social thinking instead of guardians of outworn ideas.
The method of science has been applied to social problems thus far
only by the academician and specialist. There is greatly needed a social
engineer who will apply that method over a wide front and in the practi-
cal solution of urgent social problems. There is greatly needed a social
engineer who, through the application of the best available knowledge,
will teach men new and better ways of meeting their problems-of set-
ling their disputes. There is no doubt of the opportunity. There is
simply a question as to whether the lawmen will grasp it or whether the
opportunity will, itself, create a new type of public servant-a real social
engineer.
